TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 2001 — Now that the Marines have landed in Afghanistan, the debate over the war on terrorism is shifting to where American forces should fight next. Yesterday, in response to a reporter’s question, President Bush signaled that Iraq may be next in line. "If you develop weapons of mass destruction that you want to terrorize the world, you’ll be held accountable," said Bush, saying he wanted weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. What would America do if Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein refuses to let inspectors come back, Bush was asked. "He’ll find out," was the response.

Bush is quite obviously laying the foundation for a future military strike against Iraq. But if Bush wants to try to finish the job that his father started, he’ll again have to overcome the force generally responsible for impeding American war efforts: the US State Department. UPI’s Eli Lake reported in last week’s edition of the Weekly Standard that the State Department has begun working with Saddam Hussein’s former military commanders — who have fled Iraq and officially oppose their erstwhile leader — to prepare for military action in Iraq. The Middle East Institute think tank gathered these officers for a session titled "The Future of the Iraqi Armed Forces after Saddam Hussein." The meeting followed private contacts between the commanders and the State Department.

The State Department’s activities are disappointing for those serious about getting rid of Saddam Hussein because the strategy of enticing one of the Iraqi dictator’s Baath Party rivals to rise up and replace him was tried in the early and mid ’90s. It obviously failed. For some reason, the stability-minded folks in Foggy Bottom, where the State Department is located, seem to want Iraq’s next leader to be as much like Saddam Hussein as possible — only not as dangerous. If he were to be replaced by a ruthless — but relatively careful — dictator like the late Hafez al-Assad of Syria, presumably that would be a good thing. Worse, these alleged Baath Party commanders — the pool of so-called opponents to Hussein — are very often compromised. This means either they or those close to them work for Hussein, and Saddam stays in power.

The State Department — along with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council — has been pushing this internal-coup idea for years. This is despite the fact that in 1998 the United States Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which President Clinton signed, authorizing America to fund the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a democratic group that opposes Hussein, to the tune of $97.5 million. But the State Department always found ways to flout the will of Congress on the law. For example, the department assigned a diplomat — Frank Ricciardone, the Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq — to work with the INC. Ricciardone, whose job seemed to entail spinning the group in circles, organized lengthy negotiations between various opposition factions and held high-profile meetings around the world. He seemed especially interested in what curriculum Iraqi schools would use once Saddam Hussein was gone. In short, the State Department did everything except really try get rid of Saddam Hussein. If any of this sounds familiar, it should. It’s the same way the State Department attempted to water down the Northern Alliance until events — i.e., the fall of the Taliban — overtook its machinations.

There’s obviously a policy split in the Bush administration about what to do with Iraq. The first question is whether or not to attack. The second is which opposition group to back. If the Bush administration settles on a policy of installing a Saddam Hussein–lite, it could be as harmful for US interests in the Middle East as not doing anything at all.

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