IT SHOULD BE obvious by now that the planners of the Iraq war hoped to avoid all this. With the help of a well-placed informant, the Bush administration tried to eliminate Hussein with a cruise-missile strike targeted at a bunker believed to contain the dictator as well as members of his inner leadership circle Wednesday night. For the two days following that strike, American leaders seemed to hope that the bulk of Iraqi forces would simply surrender. The much-hyped " Shock and Awe " bombing campaign began Friday as some 320 cruise missiles destroyed two of Hussein’s palaces and numerous other governmental buildings in Baghdad. Minutes after the barrage, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took to the airwaves to reiterate his suggestion — first made last Thursday — that Iraqi forces give up. " They’re beginning to realize, I suspect, that the regime is history, " Rumsfeld said. " Those close to Saddam Hussein will likely begin searching for a way to save themselves. Those whose obedience is based on fear may well begin to lose their fear of him. Officers and soldiers in the field will increasingly see that their interests lie not in dying for a doomed regime. "

Rumsfeld’s comments underscored one of the key miscalculations in the war to date. War planners, particularly Rumsfeld, who believed the war could be prosecuted largely with Special Forces operating with opposition soldiers, thought that a legitimate show of force against Hussein would prompt the bulk of Iraqi soldiers to surrender. An unnamed Bush-administration official described the thinking behind the first days of the war to the Washington Post last week: " What they’re trying to do right now is to punish the regime and give forces a chance to capitulate.... It’s a selective use of force to see if you can separate the people from the regime. " Such a statement suggests that the Bush people have forgotten one of the chief lessons of Vietnam: that a " selective use of force " can fail, and fail miserably, at demoralizing the enemy.

The " Shock and Awe " bombing campaign may have looked impressive on television, but think what it represented to Hussein and his minions, who have been closely watching American military campaigns since the early 1990s. From the perspective of the leaders of the Ba’athist regime, such bombing attacks were child’s play. The Iraqis have already incorporated into their strategic calculations the understanding that any war with America means the destruction of their buildings. President Bill Clinton did something quite similar in 1998’s four-day bombing campaign, Operation Desert Fox. The Americans are great at bombing empty buildings at night, the Iraqi military leadership believes. " Shock and Awe " just reinforced that view. In fact, because it presumably left unscathed many of Hussein’s leadership arms — such as the Fedayeen Saddam, the fanatical irregular troops who subjugate domestic opponents, and the Mukhabarat, the secret police — the average Iraqi soldier had every incentive not to surrender. Ironically, what Rumsfeld and his colleagues underestimated was their opponent’s villainy.

In recent days there have been unconfirmed reports and speculation by US-led intelligence sources that Hussein — somewhat understandably given Wednesday night’s attack and hints by American spokesmen of discussions with Hussein’s underlings — executed much of his inner circle. No one should forget that Hussein routinely eliminates anyone who even might be a rival. Shortly after he came to power in 1979, for example, he called members of the Revolutionary Command Council and other Ba’ath Party members together for a meeting. Before cameras that filmed the proceedings, the names of 60 " traitors " who allegedly plotted against him were called out. They were taken away and executed. In 1995, Hussein Kemal, Hussein’s son-in-law, defected to Jordan. When Kemal, the father of Hussein’s grandchildren, returned to Iraq in February 1996 at the Iraqi leader’s behest, Hussein had him killed. A typical punishment for even routine dissent is the removal of one’s tongue. As British prime minister Tony Blair stated to the British Parliament earlier this month in a reference to Hussein’s repression: " Just last week, someone slandering Saddam was tied to a lamp post in a street in Baghdad, his tongue cut out, mutilated and left to bleed to death, as a warning to others. "

Even if an individual officer were to surrender, Hussein and his various henchmen would still have access to that person’s family members. In other words, surrender almost certainly means a death sentence for those closest to the people the Pentagon is trying to win over. Recent defectors have told members of intelligence services that Hussein has murdered nearly a hundred army officers since 1999. In Hussein’s Iraq, repercussions against family members of those against whom the dictator has a grievance are commonplace.

With this knowledge, it almost defies credulity that the Pentagon could believe that " Shock and Awe " would have convinced anyone to surrender. Michael R. Gordon, writing in the New York Times on Tuesday, reported that the Pentagon has held back hundreds of attacks at important targets for of fear of civilian casualties. Other reports suggest that Hussein is deliberately placing troops and other resources among the civilian population. Given that the bombing isn’t affecting Hussein loyalists, it’s possible that Pentagon strategy is actually emboldening them.

Beyond all that, something else may be hindering Iraqi surrender: memories of 1991. The Shiah of Southern Iraq, in particular, may be reluctant to help American and British forces hunt down the Fedayeen Saddam, because they still remember what happened to the Shiah who did so in back then. That was when President George H.W. Bush called on them to rise up against Hussein only to do nothing when Hussein’s henchmen brutally put down their rebellion. In some cases, American pilots and soldiers could see armed-helicopter attacks on civilian rebels but — pursuant to orders from superiors abiding by the ceasefire agreement that ended the Persian Gulf War — were prevented from defending the Shiah. In light of that grim history, an ambivalent greeting from the Shiah should have been expected. Even worse, it’s possible that in the years since that rebellion the Shiah could have gravitated toward their religious brethren in Iran, who have every incentive to want to slow America’s liberation of Iraq. (After all, as part Bush’s " axis of evil, " they wouldn’t want to be next.) All these factors add up to one thing: the war in Iraq will be far from easy.

WHICH RAISES the question: where does that leave US-led forces? It’s hard to say with any certainty, of course, but things don’t look to get any easier. And that's not even taking into account that military experts say the gathering British and American force headed toward Baghdad is not as large as it should be. Perhaps as a reflection of just how easy this campaign was expected to be, there has been little discussion of what military types call " the order of battle. " The practice, which dates back to the battles of Marathon and Thermopylae in the fifth century BC, requires war strategists to list succinctly the strengths and weaknesses of friendly and enemy sides in battle. If such an exercise had been undertaken, we surely would have seen many more coalition boots on the ground.

As US-led forces bear down on Baghdad, it’s expected that approximately 55,000 troops will try to take the Iraqi capital. US forces will consist of the Third Infantry Division, the First Marine Expeditionary Force, and the 101st Airborne. Hussein will be defended by members of the Medina, Nida, and Hammurabi Republican Guards Divisions, and a Special Republican Guards Division, a force of between 40,000 to 50,000. Historically, it’s been maintained that an invading force should outnumber defenders by a three-to-one-ratio. Less than that poses peril for invaders — although optimists argue that technology alters that traditional rule of thumb.

In hindsight, it appears that Turkey’s refusal to let the US unload 21,000 troops of the Fourth Infantry Division and equipment in Turkey and then base them in Northern Iraq may have devastating consequences. When the US NATO ally voted down any assistance to the US, it meant that this crucial additional division would not be in Iraq in time to help remove Hussein from Baghdad. Retired General Wesley Clark, who commanded NATO forces during the 1999 Kosovo War, said on CNN Sunday night that the Americans were undermanned. " We’re missing three very heavy Army divisions that would have been here, " said Clark. " These divisions were scheduled to deploy but they didn’t get there. Boots-on-the-ground strength is low. There’s a very hard, strong crust leading up to Baghdad. Command hopes they can do it with these forces, and I hope so. " Retired General Barry McCaffrey told the Washington Post on Tuesday, " In my judgment there should have been a minimum of two heavy divisions and an armored-cavalry regiment on the ground — that’s how our doctrine reads. "

Making matters worse, Turkey has sent thousands of troops to the Northern Iraqi border, and some reports say that Turkish troops have even entered Iraq. This raises the specter that one of the purported goals of " Operation Iraqi Freedom " — granting freedom to the Kurds of the Northern Iraq, who have struggled with both Hussein and Turkey — may not take place. The Kurds, of course, have lived in relative freedom thanks to a US-imposed " no-fly zone " in place since the end of the Persian Gulf War, which has prevented Hussein’s forces from terrorizing the Kurds. This raises the potential for conflict among American allies in this tinderbox region, which may create the need to divert troops to the north — and away from fighting Hussein.

For all these difficulties, US-led forces will likely prevail. American and British technology, firepower, and teamwork will probably prove to be too much for Hussein loyalists. But one has to wonder what lies ahead. In a dispatch for the Jerusalem Post, correspondent Yigal Tzur, who is embedded with US troops, likened the American soldiers he was traveling with to the Israeli forces who, with great optimism, invaded Lebanon in 1982. The Israelis were greeted as liberators in the South by the Shiah, who now make up the terrorist group Hezbollah. " Coming under live fire has apparently changed the behavior of an American army that has learned firsthand the lessons of movement in battle formation, " Tzur wrote, describing how the Americans have taken to traveling with their lights off at night and identifying incoming shell-fire. " What the IDF learned at a high cost in lives in Lebanon in a drawn-out 18-year process, the Americans are learning now in the course of their advance, quickly and hastily. " The war in Iraq may indeed be over quickly, but far more bloodily than Americans — like the Ancient Athenians — ever expected. After one week of fighting, it’s likely that American troops — and the American public — may be changed, perhaps forever.

Seth Gitell can be reached at sgitell[a]phx.com